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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT J. PARENT,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,

-vs-

Case No. 12033

JOHN W. TURNER, Warden,
Utah State Prison,
Defendant and
Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
Robert J. Parent, an inmate of the
Utah State Prison, brought a petition for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus upon the ground that
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during his arraignment he was denied his
right to court-appointed counsel.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Mr. Parent initiated this action
by petition to the Utah Supreme Court
(R-3).

The petition was assigned for

hearing to the District Court of Weber
County.

The District Court denied

the Writ and remanded Mr. Parent to the
Sheriff of Weber County to be reincarcerated in the Utah State Prison (R-10).
RELIEF SOUGHT
Mr. Parent prays the court to grant
the Writ of Habeas Corpus and to Order
that he be discharged forthwith from
the custody of defendant-respondent and
that the Judgment of the District Court
of Weber County, State of Utah entered
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August 18, 1969, sentencing him to a
term of zero to five years in the Utah
State Penitentiary, be vacated.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Robert J. Parent was arraigned on
a charge of assault with a deadly weapon
before the District Court of Weber County
on August 18, 1969 (R-7).
without counsel.

He appeared

The Court asked him if

he had an attorney at the preliminary
hearing and if he had any money, to
which he replied, "No"

(R-7).

He was

asked if he wanted a lawyer and he said,
"No, I don't"

(R-8).

He was not asked

if he wanted the Court to appoint an
attorney without cost to him.
told that ".

He was

. . this is a felony charge,
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and carries with it a penitentiary sentence"

(R-8).

The Court did not mention

the potential duration of the sentence
until it was pronounced.

There was no

discussion of possible lesser statutory
offenses included within the conduct of
which he was accused or the range of
allowable punishments for those offenses.
No inquiry was made with regard to possible defenses or mitigating circumstances.
Mr. Parent pleaded guilty to the
charge of assault with a deadly weapon
(R-8).

He was sentenced to a term of

zero to five years in the State Penitentiary (R-9).
Mr. Parent filed a Writ of Habeas

-4-

Corpus with the Utah Supreme Court
January 29, 1970 (R-3).

The hearing on

the Writ was held February 16, 1970
before the District Court of Weber County.
Mr. Parent was represented by L. G.
Bingham, Esq., appointed by the court
to represent him at the hearing on the
Writ.

Defendant-respondent was repres-

ented by Gary Gale, Esq., Assistant
District Attorney.
During the hearing on the Writ, Mr.
Parent, referring to his arraignment,
testified as follows

Q.

(R-25, 26):

(By Mr. Gale)

And you were

advised that you had a right
to a jury trial, do you recall
that?
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A.

No, I don't.

Q.

Do you recall waiving that
right?

A.

I remember that I waived
obtaining counsel.

Q.

All right.

And that was

both at the preliminary
and at the arraignment in
District Court?
A.

Yes, but at that time I
was on welfare and I couldn't
afford counsel.

Q.

Well, you were advised if
you couldn't afford counsel
one would be appointed for
you?
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MR. BINGHAM:

Pardon me, which

time?
Q.

Speaking of the City Court.

A.

The City Court, yes.

Q.

All right.

So you knew that if

you couldn't afford counsel, one
would be appointed?
A.

Right.

I figured it would be

appointed in here.

Q.

(By Mr. Bingham)

If the Court

had indicated to you counsel would have
been provided for you, no charge to you
if you could not afford one, would you
have asked for counsel?
A.

Yes (R-30).
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ARGUMENT
ROBERT J. PARENT WAS DENIED HIS
RIGHT TO COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL WITHOUT
COST TO HIM IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
The circumstances under which Mr.
Parent said he did not want a lawyer did
not satisfy the basic requirements for
a valid waiver of counsel as set forth
by the Supreme Court of the United States.
In addition, there was no valid waiver
.because court-appointed counsel was not
clearly or specifically offered to him
even though the court was informed of his
inability to pay for an attorney.
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The law set forth by the Supreme
Court of the United States regarding an
accused's right to court-appointed counsel and waiver thereof is summarized
by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
in the case of Shawan vs. Cox, 350 F.
2d 909 at page 912:
It is now settled law that
the Fourteenth Amendment makes
obligatory on the states the
provision of the Sixth Amendment
requiring that the accused in all
criminal prosecutions be afforded
the right to have the assistance
of counsel for his defense,
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
3)5, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799.
Also, a defendant who pleads
guilty is entitled to the benefit
of counsel, and a request for the
same is not necessary.
Rice v.
Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 65 S.Ct. 989,
89 L.Ed. 1367. If an accused is
incapable of adequately conduct-

-9-

ing his own defense, is unable to
procure his own counsel and does
not intelligently and understandingly waive the right to counsel,
it is the duty of the court to
provide counsel for him.
Rice v.
Olson, supra. The trial judge
before whom an accused, charged
with a felony, appears without
counsel, must make a thorough
inquiry to determine whether there
is an understanding and intelligent
waiver of counsel. He must investigate to the end that there can
be no question about the waiver,
which should include an explanation of the charge, the punishment provided by law, any possible
defenses to the charge or circumstances in mitigation thereof and
explain all other facts of the case
essential for the accused to have
a complete understanding. Powell
v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158. To
constitute a valid waiver there
..
must be an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of the right,
or in the words of Justice Brennan in: .·
Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506,
82 S.Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed.2d 70, "The
record must show, or there must be
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an allegation and evidence which
show, that an accused was offered
counsel but intelligently and
understandingly rejected the offer.
Anything less is not waiver."
(Emphasis added.)
There is no evidence in the record
tending to show that Mr. Parent understood
the gravity of his situation prior to
sentencing.

Indeed, only one of six vital

elements of a valid waiver was even discussed.

The elements of a valid waiver

of counsel are set forth in the Powell
case, supra, and in VonMoltke v. Gillies,
332 U.S. 708, 723; 92 L.Ed. 309, 320;
68 s.ct. 316.

In these cases the Supreme

Court of the United States stated that
the fact that an accused may tell the .
Court that he is informed of his right
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to counsel and desires to waive this right
does not automatically end the Judge's
responsibility.

The VonMoltke case holds

that in order to be valid, such a waiver
must be made with an apprehension of:
1.

The nature of the charges;

2.

The

of statutory offen-

ses included within the
charges;
3.

The range of allowable punishments for such offenses;

4.

Possible defenses to the
charges;

\·

5.

Mitigating circumstances;

6.

All other facts essential
to a broad understanding of
the whole matter.
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other, possibly lesser offenses included
within the conduct of which he was accused.
Possible defenses to the charges

I.

were not explored.

The Court did not

advise Mr. Parent that counsel could be
valuable in finding and preparing possible
defenses, in evaluating the evidence against
him and in advising him of his chances for
acquittal or conviction on a lesser charge
should the case go to trial.
No inquiry was made regarding mitigating circumstances or their possible effect
upon the severity of the sentence.
Although the court was informed of
Mr. Parent's inability to pay for an attor-

1 ·

ney, no clear and specific offer of court-
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--appointed counsel was made.

The question,

"Do you want a lawyer?" does not specify
whether the court is referring to an
attorney retained at the expense of the
accused or to court-appointed counsel
or both.

The sophisticated defendant

could resolve this uncertainty by answering "Yes, but I can't afford one."
However, it is unreasonable to expect
every accused to resort to this magic
phrase.

It is just as likely that an

accused would answer in the negative,
bearing in mind his inability to pay and
his uncertainty as to whether the Court
was referring to retained counsel or
appointed counsel.

The intimidating
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F'

atmosphere of a criminal courtroom does
not encourage an accused to ask the Court
to clarify its statements.
Mr. Parent's understanding of the
meaning of the court's question is
illustrated by his testimony at the
hearing on the Writ wherein he st;ted
that he thought he had waived his "right
to obtain counsel"
added) .

(R-25)

(emphasis

In other words, he understood

the Court's question as to whether he
wanted an attorney to mean, "Do you
wish to obtain an attorney at your own
expense?"

He further explained that he

did not obtain counsel because he was on

I
I·

welfare and could not afford an attorney

I

(R-26).
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Mr. Parent's testimony also indicates
that he expected the trial court to appoint
an attorney for him after he had waived
his right to obtain counsel (R-26).

No

such appointment was offered or made.
This testimony further illustrates Mr.
Parent's misunderstanding of his position
and of court procedure.
It may be argued that if Mr. Parent
truly expected counsel to be appointed
by the trial court he would have insisted
upon appointment of counsel before entering his plea.

But such an argument places

the responsibility on the accused to
initiate appointment of counsel by his
insistence.

Giving the accused the respon-
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sibility to take the initiative would
operate to the detriment of the unintelligent, the unlearned and the timid.

The

accused may fail to insist because he
mistakenly thinks that the trial court
has discretion to deny appointed counsel
to an indigent

with a felpny.

The accused may not insist because he is
not brash enough to assert himself in a
courtroom setting.

For an accused to

satisfactorily protect himself he would
have to possess a degree of legal expertise
and a capacity for self-assertion not
commonly found among the general population.
The sixth and fourteenth amendments

I.

to the federal constitution guarantee that
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an accused shall not be required to
shoulder such an ominous burden.

In-

stead, the responsibility is placed
squarely on the trial court to see to
it that an accused's right to appointed
counsel is intelligently and understandingly waived.

The issue in this case is

not whether Mr. Parent made timely insistence, but whether the court made
adequate inquiry to satisfy the minimum
requirements for valid waiver.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's failure to explore
the basic elements of a valid waiver of
counsel and its further failure to specifically and clearly off er appointed counsel

-19-

substantially deprived Mr. Parent of his
right to court-appointed counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States.

The Writ of Habeas

to be granted.

ought

Mr.. Parent ought. to be

discharged forthwith from custody and
the judgment of the trial court ought
to be vacated.
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